Albanians were among the more neglected of Macedonia’s mostly impoverished citizens, but the Macedonian government did not persecute them. Macedonia’s ruling coalition included Albanian and other minority leaders; indeed, it was generally held to be the most democratic of Yugoslavia’s post-communist governments.

Thus, when clashes broke out between Macedonian security forces and Albanian irregulars in 2000, the U.S. and the European Union (EU) took a firm stand against the latter.

Albanian irredentists moved from Kosovo to bordering Macedonian districts after the province became an international protectorate in late 1999. They lost little time in taking control of the northern Albanian districts in Macedonia, from where they launched sporadic attacks on Macedonian security forces and civilians. If the Macedonian government responded with force, they hoped, the international community might support their goal of seceding to Kosovo.

Map B.28: Macedonia and Its Neighbors (click to enlarge)

That hope did not last long. NATO chief Javier Solana flew down to Skopje to support the Macedonian government’s campaign against Albanian irredentists, whom he called “terrorists.” The U.S. put pressure on Kosovo’s leaders to disavow Macedonian Albanian claims, and Albania tightened its border controls to prevent the flow of arms to Macedonia.

In Kosovo, international peacekeepers accelerated the demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) — who provided arms and funds to the Albanian irredentists in Macedonia — and dismissed over a hundred former KLA militants who had been absorbed into the retrained Kosovo security force.

But NATO did not accede to the Macedonian government’s request for troops’, logistical and materiel support in their operations against the Albanian insurgents. Instead, the U.S. and the EU tried to broker a cease-fire and devolution agreement between the government and the insurgents. At first, both international and government efforts were geared towards using moderate Albanian politicians as a bridge to the insurgents, and in May 2001 their efforts yielded fruit.

Under the auspices of the OSCE, the government’s Albanian representatives and the insurgents agreed on a cease-fire and amnesty for Albanian guerrillas on May 22. In return, the Macedonian government would increase Albanian representation in administrative and public sector bodies — though Albanians comprised some 25 % of the population, less than 10 % of government employees were Albanian — establish an Albanian-language university, and ensure district level devolution in Albanian majority areas.

Map B.29: Municipalities in Macedonia (click to enlarge)

Source: UN Development Program (UNDP) http://www.undp.org.mk/nivogore/mapsF.htm

Macedonian nationalists, including the ruling party, whose numbers had shot up since the outbreak of conflict in Kosovo in 1998, saw the agreement as a sellout. If the Albanian guerillas were seen to have won the rights that moderate Albanian leaders were negotiating with the government, many amongst the international community agreed, it would give a fillip to the irredentists.

With the support of the U.S. and the EU, the Macedonian government decided on a two-track approach instead: a decommissioning and modified amnesty agreement with the guerrillas, and an agreement on Albanian rights with moderate Albanian political parties.

In June 2001, NATO agreed to Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski’s request that NATO disarm the Albanian guerrillas if an agreement on decommissioning was reached. Privately, the U.S. and the EU had pressured the KLA to tell the guerrillas in Macedonia that they had no option but to agree.

Political negotiations on a devolution formula continued by fits and starts through June and July, while violence continued. The Macedonian army’s counter-insurgency policy, which comprised little other than bombing guerrilla strongholds in the north, succeeded simply in widening the conflict. By the summer of 2001, Albanian fighters had massed close to the capital, Skopje.

The conflict looked as if it might spiral out of control, but a joint U.S.-French initiative — France chaired the EU at the time — broke the deadlock. The Macedonian government and Albanian representatives were whisked away to the lakeside retreat of Ohrid, where they were presented with a framework agreement to work over.

On August 13, 2001, the Macedonian government and Albanian representatives signed the Ohrid Accords in Skopje. The following day, Albanian guerrillas agreed to surrender their weapons under NATO supervision. In exchange, Trajkovski pledged to grant amnesty to the NLA, excluding those suspected of war crimes.

Highlights of the Ohrid Agreement Albanian guerrillas to disarm and disband under NATO supervision. Macedonian government to devolve local administration, and allow Albanian to be an official language where Albanians comprise 20% or more of the population. Municipal councils to select local heads of police, though police service to remain centrally administered. Equitable representation for minorities in public administration jobs. Legislation affecting minority rights or status to be enacted only by a two-thirds majority including at least 50% of the minority’s members of parliament. The Macedonian constitution to be amended, with a preamble stressing Macedonia’s civil society, and list all the religious denominations in the country. Macedonia’s official “Council on Interethnic Relations” to comprise equal numbers of Macedonian Slavs and Albanians and proportional representation of the smaller minorities.

In September 2001 NATO troops began collecting weapons from the Albanian guerrillas. Within a month, they had collected some 2,000 weapons. The Macedonian government protested this was a derisorily small number, which it was.

But most analysts viewed the NATO decommissioning effort as having a symbolic rather than substantive purpose. Albanian guerrillas could always acquire weapons with the money they were sent by the Albanian Diaspora, especially in the U.S. The KLA had received more than $2 million per year from the Diaspora during the Kosovo conflict, and much of that money reverted to Macedonian Albanian guerrillas when the Kosovo conflict ended.

In other words, communal peace in Macedonia depended on the implementation of the devolution provisions of the Ohrid Accords. And implementation, in its turn, depended on whether the Macedonian government had the resources which it had thus far lacked. Well before the clashes broke out in 2000, the Macedonian government had pledged to increase Albanian employment in government bodies to 10 %, but was too cash strapped to fulfil the pledge.

The EU promised more aid as well as closer cooperation with the Macedonian government on implementing the Ohrid Accords. Whether the required resources will be more promptly supplied than in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo remains an open question.

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Chapter Contents
			The Balkans Peace Process
		·	The UN Protected Areas
		·	Bosnia's Failed Peace Plans
		·	The Washington Agreement
		·	The Dayton Agreement
		·	A Kosovo Protectorate
		·	Devolution in Macedonia

Related Texts
·	Framework Agreement (Ohrid Accords)
·	Macedonia: Country Background & Recent Conflict, CRS Report for Congress, November 7, 2001
·	Macedonia’s Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It, International Crisis Group