After spending the bulk of November at Dayton, Ohio, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian leaders agreed to a federal arrangement along the lines of the Washington Agreement, with an even weaker central government, and devolution at both national and local levels.

At Holbrooke’s prompting, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic appointed himself negotiator for the Bosnian Serbs, superceding their own leaders. The ploy allowed two critical concessions from the Serbs — to place the link town between western and eastern Bosnian Serb territories, Brcko, under international arbitration, and to reunite Sarajevo, which the Bosnian Serbs had partitioned, under Bosnian administration.

In return, Bosnian and Croatian forces would withdraw from some of the Serbian held territories they had conquered during the summer 1995 campaign. Though Bosnia & Herzegovina would be one country, the Serbs would have a separate republic comprising 49 % of the territory of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The country would consist of two “Entities,” the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska.

Map B.25: The Front Lines and the Dayton Peace Agreement, November 1995 (click to enlarge)

Like the Washington Agreement, the Dayton Peace Agreement devolved powers away from the center and allocated powers according to ethnic identity. Instead of a single president or Prime Minister, there would be a three-member presidency of a Bosniac, a Croat and a Serb, and a center whose responsibilities would be limited to foreign or inter-entity affairs.

In addition to the two chambers of the Federation, and the single chamber of the Serbian Entity, Bosnia & Herzegovina would have a central parliamentary assembly made up of the House of Peoples and House of Representatives. The former would comprise equal numbers of Muslims, Croats and Serbs, and the latter would have two-thirds of its members elected by the federation and one third by the Serbian entity. Even the governing board of the central bank was to consist of a Muslim, a Croat and a Serb.

Unlike the Washington Agreement, which devolved powers to cantons and municipalities, the Dayton Peace Agreement devolved powers to two territorial units — the federation and the Serbian entity — and thus tacitly accepted a two-way partition of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Each entity not only had its own parliament, army, police force and law courts, but also the right to enter into parallel relationships with the neighboring states of Croatia and Yugoslavia, and to make agreements with them and with international organizations. In other words, while Bosnia’s Croats were restrained from seceding to Croatia by the federation with Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia’s Serbs faced fewer controls on their efforts to integrate into Serbia.

Highlights of the Dayton Peace Agreement Bosnia & Herzegovina to be a loose federation of two Entities: the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Serbian Republic. Inter Entity borders to be open. Each Entity to have own security and police force. Entities can enter into parallel relationships with neighboring states, and make agreements with international organizations, subject to ratification by Parliamentary Assembly. Federation and Serbian armies to withdraw to zone of separation. Parties to disarm and disband all armed civilian groups within 30 days. All foreign forces to withdraw (including freedom fighters). Sarajevo to be reunited and Mostar to continue under EU administration. Brcko to be placed under international arbitration. Peacetime transition to be overseen by a UN-EU to High Representative for Bosnia & Herzegovina. Elections to be organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). UNHCR to supervise return of refugees.

Though many of the security provisions tilted towards a partition based on the separation of forces, the Dayton Peace Agreement also included significant provisions for reintegration. Both Entities were committed to freedom of movement across Bosnia & Herzegovina; neither could set up road controls. Placing Brcko under international arbitration effectively blocked Serbian attempts to secede.

The return of refugees and displaced people would remix the areas that had been “ethnically cleansed” in the drive to partition, and war crimes would be prosecuted. The two Entities would enter into cooperative economic projects and shared energy use. There would be regional arms control, and regional stabilization initiatives.

A massive international effort would implement these provisions. The OSCE would oversee arrangements for arms control and military balance, between the Entities and at the regional level. (The agreement allocated arms and troops in the following proportion: 5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: 2 Croatia: 2 Bosnia-Herzegovina; within Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 1 Republika Srpska).

NATO would send a 60,000 strong force to keep the peace, and work with the International Tribunal on war crimes to arrest the men it indicted.

Map B.26: Implementation Force Dispositions in Bosnia (click to enlarge)

The OSCE would also organize the Bosnian elections. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would supervise the return of refugees and displaced persons. The European Court for Human Rights would supervise the creation of a Constitutional Court, comprising 2 Muslims, 2 Croats, 2 Serbs and three foreigners.

The IMF would appoint the governor of the central bank, and the IMF, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) would supervise reconstruction work. The UN would supervise policing, including the creation of a multiethnic police force. And Bosnia & Herzegovina’s five parliamentary chambers would all be superceded by a UN-EU appointed High Representative.

While these provisions gave the international community considerable leeway to erase the lines of partition, they carried inherent risks. So many different centers of local and international authority could create a dependent economy and political institutions, thus undermining stabilization and reconstruction — and the nation building that was so vitally needed. Many of these organizations were to work together for the first time, and coordination had already proved to be a problem during the war, with different international organizations pulling in different directions.

What’s more, the exceptional level of international involvement was not matched by an equally high commitment to aid. Even the minimum required for basic infrastructure repairs and reconstruction, which the World Bank determined was $4 billion, only raised pledges of some $1.5 billion in the months following the Dayton Peace Agreement.

Yet the future of Bosnia & Herzegovina, to a considerable extent, depended on the economic and political measures that the international community took to hold the peace. Without a speedy injection of reconstruction aid, the lines of partition were likely to harden in such a way as to make recovery much more difficult. And without nation building, it was unlikely that reintegration provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement would kick in

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Chapter Contents
			The Balkans Peace Process
		·	The UN Protected Areas
		·	Bosnia's Failed Peace Plans
		·	The Washington Agreement
		·	The Dayton Agreement
		·	A Kosovo Protectorate
		·	Devolution in Macedonia

Related Texts
·	The Dayton Peace Agreement: Official Texts, U.S. Dept. of State
·	The Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko Area, U.S. Dept. of State