Tensions had started to rise in the Serbian areas of Croatia in the late 1980s, due in large part to the growing nationalist movements in Serbia and Croatia, and there was an arms buildup in the autonomous enclave of Knin, which straddled the critical routes from north and eastern Croatia to the Adriatic coast, with a flourishing tourist economy.

There were sporadic clashes between Croatian security forces and Serbian rebels in Knin during the late 1980s, which intensified following Croatia’s declaration of independence. The Yugoslav Army treated the declaration of independence as an act of war, and began shelling at the border as well as at cities like Dubrovnik.

With Croatia at war, and the risk of a spillover to Bosnia imminent, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 713 (September 25, 1991) calling on all member states to implement a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.”

On October 8, 1991, the then secretary general of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar appointed former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to be his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. Vance subsequently convened a meeting in Geneva on November 23, which was attended by the Presidents of Serbia and of Croatia, the Secretary of State for National Defense of Yugoslavia, and Lord Carrington.

Vance was able to broker an agreement to cease-fire in Croatia at the Geneva meeting, which was expanded into a wider peace plan in January 1992. Under the terms of the Vance Plan, a UN peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), would be stationed in “United Nations Protected Areas” (UNPAs) in Croatia.

Map B.20: The United Nations Protected Areas (click to enlarge)

The UNPAs were divided into four sectors (Sectors North and South included the Krajina (border) region, Sector West included western Slavonia and Sector East included eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Srijem. Rebel Serb forces controlled all sectors except for the northern half of Sector West. On February 21, the Security Council authorized the full deployment of the force through resolution 794 (1992).

Under the terms of the Vance Plan, UNPROFOR was asked to:

1. demilitarize the UNPAs and ensure the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from all of Croatia; and
2. facilitate the reconstruction and monitoring of the local police force and to protect ethnic minorities (i.e., non-Serbs) in the UNPAs.

Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers were to verify the withdrawal of JNA units from Croatia. UNPROFOR was also to supervise the repatriation of displaced civilians to their homes in the UNPAs.

There were several subsequent enlargements of UNPROFOR’s mandate. On August 7, 1992, the Security Council approved resolution 769 (1992) which enlarged UNPROFOR’s strength and mandate to enable the force to control the entry of civilians into the UNPAs and to perform immigration and customs functions where the UNPA borders coincided with international frontiers. In October 6, 1992 the Security Council authorized UNPROFOR to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula near Dubrovnik (UNSCR 779 of 1992).

Though the UNPROFOR mandate was to demilitarize the UNPAS and create local security forces that would cooperate with the Croatian forces, the terms of the mandate made both demilitarization and security difficult. UNPROFOR was authorized to place heavy weapons under guard, but not to destroy or remove them from the territories. Heavy weapons remained in the UNPAs, and Croatian Serbs fought alongside Bosnian Serbs when war broke out in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1992.

In 1993, the UNPAs were used as a launching pad for attacks on the U.N.-declared “safe areas” in Bosnia. Serbian forces also continued to expel Croat and Hungarian minorities. The repatriation of refugees did not occur. UNPROFOR’s chief success was in physically separating Croatian government forces and Serb rebels on the battlefield, thereby averting a resumption of all out war.

In addition, Serbian forces refused to withdraw from areas that they had agreed to return to Croatian government control. Also in violation of the Vance plan, the Croatian Army retook these areas by force and committed numerous abuses against ethnic Serbs, especially in the Medak pocket.

These shortcomings eventually led Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to demand that UNPROFOR terminate its mission in March 1995. After considerable pressure from the U.S., the Croatian government agreed to let UNPROFOR remain in Croatia under a new mandate approved by the UN Security Council on March 31, 1995.

Under the terms of the new mandate, the UN Security Council established another mission in Croatia, the UN Croatia force (UNCRO), which would monitor Croatia’s international borders with Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia as well as continue monitoring the internal cease fire line. The mission continues to date.

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Chapter Contents
			The Balkans Peace Process
		·	The UN Protected Areas
		·	Bosnia's Failed Peace Plans
		·	The Washington Agreement
		·	The Dayton Agreement
		·	A Kosovo Protectorate
		·	Devolution in Macedonia

Related Links
·	Human Rights Watch: Croatia “The Croatian Army Offensive in Western Slavonia and Its Aftermath”
·	U.S. General Accounting Office Report: “Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia. (Briefing Report, 05/08/95, GAO/NSIAD-95-148BR)”
·	UN UNPROFOR Page
·	George Mason University UNPROFOR page