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Macedonia's Albanians Unlike their chiefly reactive responses to the conflicts in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia, the U.S. and EU tried a proactive strategy in Macedonia. Afraid that simmering tensions in Kosovo could spread to neighboring Albanian districts in Macedonia, and that a conflict in Macedonia would draw Greece and Bulgaria in, the U.S. and the EU pushed for the first preventive peacekeeping deployment in the history of the UN, a 700 strong UN border monitoring force.
Originally under the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was also tasked with missions in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, the force was to “report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory.” UNPROFOR moved into Macedonia in December 1992, and proved to be a stabilizing influence. In 1995, when UNPROFOR was dissolved to form separate country missions, the Macedonia monitoring force was renamed the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP). In December 1997, UNPREDEP’s mandate was extended to monitor and report on illicit arms flows, as well as to prevent or deter any clashes between Macedonians and Albanians. In July 1998, after conflict broke out in Kosovo and the Albanian majority Presevo valley in South Serbia, UNPREDEP’s force was increased to 1,050. But in February 1999 the force had to withdraw, after China vetoed the extension of its mandate. China’s veto, apparently, was in retaliation for Macedonia’s establishing diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and it gained China considerable international contumely. Macedonia had already been severely weakened by this point. On its northern flank, the ongoing tensions within Kosovo radicalized Macedonia’s large minority, which had never been adequately integrated into the mainstream. What had been an open border between Serbia and Macedonia had, after independence, yet to be formally demarcated. Not only did many Macedonian guerrillas join the Kosovo guerrilla groups, the flow of arms from Albania to Kosovo via Macedonia also increased the level of arms inside Macedonia. On its western border, Albania’s economic and political crises contributed to Macedonian impoverishment. And to its south, Macedonia’s most powerful neighbor, Greece, had a series of quarrels with the fledgling republic — over Macedonian claims to having been founded by the Greek warrior-king Alexander, over the use of the name Macedonia — which led the Greek government to delay E.U. recognition of Macedonia as a country. Ironically, Macedonia was the only former Yugoslav republic to meet the criteria that the EU had set for recognition. But Greece had a substantial Macedonian Slav minority of its own, and a policy of forced integration as against minority rights. The Greek government feared that Macedonia might stir secessionist impulses amongst the Greek Macedonian minority. Eventually, the E.U. recognized Macedonia under the name of “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM). The NATO air war against Serbia added enormously to these strains. Macedonia was host to some 350,000 refugees, and though Macedonian Albanians threw open their homes and meager resources to the Kosovars, Macedonian Slavs and the Macedonian government feared that the refugees — which included many Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters — might make common cause with Macedonian Albanian secessionists. As it happened, trouble came through another route. The Kosovo refugees returned to Kosovo almost immediately after the war ended in late 1999, and without the destabilizing impact that the Macedonian Slavs feared. But when Kosovo became an international protectorate, Macedonian Albanians who had joined the KLA, and were linked to the Albanian guerrillas in South Serbia were forced to leave. Between them, the KLA, South Serbian guerrillas and Macedonian Albanian fighters had hoped for the creation of a greater Kosovo, enlarged by the Presevo valley and the Macedonian Albanian districts, which might in time join Albania. Though this hope was temporarily quashed, the Albanian districts of Macedonia, with a history of neglect, provided another ground for aspiration. When Albanian guerrillas returned to their villages in Macedonia, they began to form parallel authorities — and in the barely policed border villages, sometimes the sole authority. Sporadic clashes between armed Albanian groups and the Macedonian security forces began in 2000, growing in volume by early 2001. The Kosovo veterans were able to exploit the common grievances of Macedonian Albanians, who saw themselves as discriminated against by the Macedonian government even though there were several Albanian representatives in the government. Albanians believed that the Macedonian constitution discriminated in favor of the Slav majority, because it stated that Macedonia was the country of Macedonians; Albanians were underrepresented in the administration and executive, and underreported in the census; and Albanian language rights were not recognized. Of the three grievances, the most potent one was lack of integration into governing structures. The Macedonian constitution clearly provided for equal rights to all citizens, even though it stated that Macedonia was the country of Macedonians (this in response to Greek opposition to the use of the term Macedonia/Macedonian), and the Macedonian government worked closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to improve minority protections. In July 2000, the Macedonian government dealt with the language issue by proposing a new Southeast European university, with Albanian language courses, which the U.S. and the EU would help fund. But the scale of Albanian employment in the civil and police services was very low. While Albanians comprised between 20-25% of the Macedonian forces, Albanians made up less than 10% of the civil and police services. In practice that meant that Albanian majority districts were under governed, had less access to state resources, and — most important of all — were under policed. Though the Macedonian government, aided by the EU, the OSCE, and allied international organizations made an attempt to accelerate the level of Albanian employment, the effort was limited by a shortage of resources and infrastructure. In March 2001, Albanian guerrillas calling themselves the National Liberation Army launched a series of attacks on Macedonian security forces in several villages along the border with Kosovo and later near the capital Skopje. The Macedonian government responded by launching a counter-insurgency campaign that, hampered by lack of training and equipment, was completely ineffective. According to the UNHCR, over 100,000 civilians fled the Albanian districts when the conflict started, of which over 70,000 went to Kosovo. Several thousand additional Macedonian Slavs fled their homes during a rebel advance in late July. The NLA claimed it had 16,000 troops, although independent estimates put the numbers at 2,000 — 2,500 full-time combatants. After a series of failed cease-fires and political negotiations under pressure from the U.S. and EU, the Macedonian government and Albanian nationalists finally came to an agreement at the lakeside retreat of Ohrid in early August 2001, and the NLA agreed to surrender its weapons under NATO supervision. In exchange, the Macedonian government pledged to grant amnesty to the NLA, except those suspected of war crimes. In late August, NATO set up a force to collect rebel weapons, comprising about 4500 troops. Operation “Essential Harvest” completed collection of a targeted amount of rebel weapons by the end of September 2001, and kept a smaller force in Macedonia to protect international civilian monitors. NATO’s peacekeeping force for Kosovo was also involved in patrolling and reinforcing the Kosovo border to cut off Albanian rebel supply routes.
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Text written by Radha Kumar and David Pacheco. Copyright, Radha Kumar, 2007. |
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