In February 1994, the UN set a two-week deadline for Croatia to pull its troops out of Bosnia, but ignored the deadline to give US diplomacy a chance. By late February, the U.S.' combined threat of sanctions and promise of military and diplomatic support to Croatia convinced Tudjman, and at the end of February, there were proximity talks in Washington between the Bosnian and Croatian leaders.

The talks yielded a draft "Framework Agreement for the Bosniac-Croat Federation," that was signed in May 1994. The Agreement created a federation of two constituent nations, Croats and Muslims (now named "Bosniacs"), and allocated government positions and parliamentary seats in a fixed number to each. Bosnian Croats would relinquish the goal of secession, but the federation would have the right to confederate with Croatia.

The Agreement also placed Mostar under a European Union administration for an interim two-year period, to reintegrate the city under "a single, self-sustaining and multi-ethnic administration." (Article 2, Memorandum of Understanding on the European Union Administration of Mostar, Brussels, 10.6.1994). In May 1994, the UN secured an agreement for freedom of movement in the Mostar region that permitted the collection and storage of heavy weapons, but did not allow the residents of Mostar to move between east and west.

There was some discussion of a similar UN administration for Sarajevo, but it would have been an awkward position for the capital of Bosnia and might have further undermined the authority of the already very fragile Bosnian government. Instead, the UN appointed a Senior Civil Officer, to deal primarily with the restoration of utilities.

Though the Framework Agreement gave Bosnian Serbs the right to join the federation, the Serbian Democratic Party interpreted it as a sign that the international community was ready to accept a two-way partition of Bosnia and demanded recognition of an independent Serb republic. There was renewed fighting between Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb forces.

By the end of June it was clear that any hopes that the Serbs would enter the federation on the same terms as the Croatians were dead. Instead, the Framework Agreement began to be viewed as primarily an interim wartime arrangement to form a joint front against Serb forces until territorial divisions were agreed. It also loosened the arms embargo against the Bosnian army, by opening a land route for weapons' supply to Bosnia, but in practice these were limited by the Croatian practice of levying a fee of upwards of 25% of each consignment.

The winter of 1994 saw renewed efforts by Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia to integrate their territories by conquering Bihac before the UN Protected Areas' mandate in Croatia expired in March 1995. Tudjman had made clear that he would not extend the mandate, and the Croatian army was by now both trained and equipped to re conquer these enclaves without much difficulty.

With Russian and Yugoslav backing - Milosevic had begun to withdraw support for the Croatian Serbs - former U.S. president Jimmy Carter persuaded the Serb forces to agree to a four-month cease-fire. Winter was in any case a low-combat time.

In spring 1995, Bosnia slid again into full-scale war. The cease-fire expired on May 1, and Serb forces began shelling Bihac again. There was intense fighting around Sarajevo. Despite the Framework Agreement, Croatian and Muslim forces were still unready to form a joint front. Instead, while the Bosnian Fifth Corps battled Serb forces at Bihac, the Croatian army attacked the UN Protected Area of West Slavonia and captured it, sending thousand of Croatian Serbs fleeing to Bosnia.

In July 1995, Serb forces launched a final onslaught on the eastern enclaves, beginning with Srebrenica. Though NATO was committed to defend the Safe Areas, air strikes had to be ordered by the UN Special Envoy to the former Yugoslavia. While NATO and the UN debated whether or not to order air strikes, Srebrenica fell, and in late July Serb forces took Zepa.

UN military officials confessed that the eastern enclaves were indefensible; they had been able to survive thus far only because of Serb acquiescence. But the terrible massacre that followed Srebrenica's fall (see Humanitarian Intervention) underlined the UN's culpability and cast doubt on NATO's will to act. Under U.S. pressure, NATO and the UN resolved their difference over the division of authority by agreeing that the decision to launch air strikes would be jointly taken by the NATO commander and the UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia & Herzegovina, rather than by a civilian authority.

U.S. attention was, in any case, focused on the western front. One year after the Framework Agreement, the U.S. finally pushed Croatia into agreeing to a joint offensive against Serb forces with the Bosnian army, but Croatia's first priority was to recapture the UN Protected Areas within its own borders.

In late July, Croatian artillery began to move into range of Serb supply lines, and in early August Croatian forces bombarded villages along the entire 90-mile border or Krajina. Over 1,500 shells hit Knin. In Belgrade, Milosevic ignored the Croatian Serb leaders' appeals for help, the Croatian army took Knin, and the largest single exodus of the war began, of Serbs from Croatia into Bosnia. Roughly 300,000 Serbs were driven out by the Croatian offensive.

While battles between the Bosnian army and Serb forces continued in central Bosnia, Croatian troops advanced north towards Banja Luka and south towards Trebinje. The UN and NATO stepped in with demands that Serb forces withdraw from the eastern enclaves that they had just taken; the demands were ignored and in late August NATO launched sweeping air strikes.

The air strikes only briefly targeted Serb forces in the eastern enclaves; instead they destroyed the Serb forces' defense and communications systems, and provided air support to the joint Bosnian-Croatian offensive that began in mid-September.

Within a few days Bosnian and Croatian troops captured hundreds of square miles between Bihac and the rest of the Bosniac-Croat federation, and by the end of October the ratio of federation-controlled territories to Serb-controlled territories tallied pretty well with the 51:49 proposed under the union of three republics plan.

Map B.16: The Front Lines, July 1993-November 1995 (click to enlarge)

Under intense international pressure, the fighting waned, and in late November 1995 intensive negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, led by the U.S. envoy, Richard Holbrooke, yielded a peace agreement that finally ended the war.

The Dayton Peace Agreement created a loose federation of two "entities" - the Bosniac-Croat federation and a Serb republic - under a joint presidency, and reunified Sarajevo. However, the two entities retained separate armies and legislatures, and implementing the agreement, including security, stabilization, reconstruction and refugee returns, was left to international institutions. A 60,000 member NATO-led international force (IFOR) entered Bosnia & Herzegovina, and a shaky peace began to take hold.

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Chapter Contents
			The Balkans Conflict
		·	The Rise of Nationalism
		·	Secession and War
		·	Bosnia's Ethnic Cleansing
		·	Humanitarian Intervention
		·	A Shaky Peace
		·	Crisis in Kosovo
		·	Macedonia's Albanians

Related Texts
·	“Washington Agreement” (Framework Agreement for the Bosniac-Croat Federation)